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Abstract
In this article, we present a reference case of mean field games. This case can be seen as a reference for two main reasons. First,
the case is simple enough to allow for explicit resolution: Bellman functions are quadratic, stationary measures are normal and
stability can be dealt with explicitly using Hermite polynomials. Second, in spite of its simplicity, the case is rich enough in terms
of mathematics to be generalized and to inspire the study of more complex models that may not be as tractable as this one.
© 2009 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
Résumé
Nous présentons un exemple archétypal de jeu à champ moyen. Cet exemple est important à deux égards. Tout d’abord, il est
suffisamment simple pour permettre l’obtention de solutions explicites : les fonctions de Bellman sont quadratiques, les mesures
stationnaires gaussiennes et l’étude de la stabilité peut se faire explicitement en utilisant les polynômes d’Hermite. Aussi, et malgré
la simplicité du problème, l’exemple que nous présentons est suffisament riche pour être transposé mutatis mutandis à d’autres
domaines d’application plus complexes.
© 2009 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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1. A short introduction to mean field games
Mean field games have been introduced by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions (2006) in two seminal papers [5,6].2 They
have been used in economic models and noticeably to model endogenous growth (see [3]). Here, we want to detail a
reference case that can be used to build and study a lot of mean field games models.
1.1. An idea from physics. . .
To well understand the nature of mean field games, the best thing to do is certainly to focus on the notion of “mean
field”. This notion is in fact inspired from particle physics. Typically, particle physicists are interested in interactions
between so many particles that they cannot use traditional physics and study each interaction among couples or triples
E-mail address: olivier.gueant@normalesup.org.
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the mean field is this media. To clarify, this field is created, in a certain sense, by the particles and impact the behavior
of the particles “who” created it. Hence, the interactions between particles are summed up by the interaction between
every single particle and the mean field, which is, in some sense, representative of the particles as a whole.
The simplest example is air pressure: pressure is created by the microscopic movements of the particles and
impacts particles in a macroscopic way, creating winds for instance. Clearly, this approach is more meaningful than a
complete description of the interactions between air particles. Although this example is simple, the type of reasoning
is important and used in quantum mechanics.
1.2. . . . that can be used in game theory and economics
The same reasoning can be used when it comes to model strategic interactions between many agents in economics.
A “mean field” could be used to have a relevant representation of reality. This remark is the starting point of mean
field game theory.
As a first example, the heart of modern economics that is the general equilibrium theory, can be considered a mean
field game where the mean field is obviously the vector of prices. Prices are indeed a relevant summary of interactions
between agents and, in turn, they influence each agent behavior. This approach certainly clarifies what a market is: the
market exists because of agents interactions and, in turn, the market induces individual behaviors.
The market is an example of mean field games but mean field games are in fact a general tool to embed externality
in models since mean fields are not constrained to be prices. Penetration rates for technologies such as wind turbines
or solar panels are instances of mean field. Other examples can be found like page ranking on the Internet or ranking
of fund managers (see [3]).
The new theory developed to study mean field games brings a comprehensive mathematical framework, some new
concepts and a new way to build models.
1.3. The definition of mean field games
The general framework of mean field game theory is given by four hypotheses:
• Rational expectations;
• Continuum of agents;
• Agents anonymity;
• Social interactions of the mean field type.
The first three hypotheses are common in game theory. The first one – the rational expectation hypothesis
– has been introduced in the 60’s and is now widely accepted among game theorists. The second hypothesis is often
used to model games with a large number of players. It is a rather well accepted approximation (see [2]) that has been
used for tractability purposes and here, for mean field games, the limit of a game with N players as N goes to infinity
has been studied in [5,7] to support this hypothesis. The third hypothesis has always been implicit in game theory but
is worth recalling. Basically, it says that agents are anonymous in the sense that any permutation of the agents does
not change the outcome of the game.
The fourth hypothesis is specific to mean field games and is an hypothesis on interactions between players.3
The main idea is that a given agent cannot take into account every single agent she is going to interact with. There-
fore, every agent is going to make a decision according to some statistics regarding the overall community of agents.
Moreover, this fourth assumption means that an agent is really atomized in the continuum and has no power but a
marginal one. Since she cannot influence (but marginally) the behavior of other agents, she has no other choices than
considering a strategy that depends only on herself and on information about the overall community, this information
being enclosed in the mean field.
In other words, the couple (x,m) is sufficient and exhaustive to explain interactions, where x is a personal charac-
teristics and m the distribution of those characteristics in the population.
3 When we say interactions here, we mean it in the micro sense since we want a micro-foundation of the behaviors.
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From a mathematical point of view, a first class of mean field games, and this class is the purpose of this paper,
appeared in a stochastic control form. With this representation, each agent can control – with a cost – the drift and/or
the volatility of a diffusion process and maximizes (in expectancy) a utility criterium that depends on this dynamical
process and on the mean field of the problem. This type of framework is really common in finance, in economics
or in engineering and corresponds, in the deterministic case to variations calculus. Noticeably, even in the stochastic
case, the problem, as far as the players are concerned as a whole, stays deterministic because of the continuum of
players and the law of large numbers. In what follows, we are going to see that the equations of this first class of mean
field games have a forward/backward structure: a backward PDE (Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman) to model the individual
backward induction process that explains each agent’s choices; a forward PDE (Kolmogorov) to model the evolution
of the players as a whole, the evolution of the community.
We are going to present this first class of mean field games in an abstract way, in the sense that we want the reader
to understand the tools and hence we focus on a problem that has explicit solutions. Typically, one may understand the
problem as a stochastic control problem in which each individual, in the continuum, chooses a characteristic in a state
space to resemble other people (in addition to the wish to be at a given place in some parts – see below). Problems
of that kind are quite common (even though specification may be different) if one thinks of technology choices for
instance since agents may want to have a good technology but a technology that is widespread among others to avoid
paying too much.
2. The general framework
In what follows, we consider a continuum of individuals (hereafter a population) that have preferences about
resembling each other. This type of problem is typically of the mean field game sort where individuals pay a price to
move from one point to another in the state space and have a utility flow that is a function of the overall distribution
of individuals in the population. We are going to model it as follows:
• The state space is an n-dimensional space.
• Each agent has a “utility” function v that can be decomposed in two parts: a pure preference part
g : (t, x) → g(m(t, x)) (where g is increasing to model the willingness to be like others) that represents what
she gets from having the characteristics x at time t (m is the distribution function of the population) and a pure
cost part h : α → h(α) that corresponds to the price to pay to make a move of size α in the state space (h is
typically supposed to be increasing, strictly convex and such that h(0) = 0).
• Each agent discounts the time at rate ρ.
• Each agent’s characteristics is moved by a Brownian motion in dimension n (specific to herself).
The problem we are dealing with can therefore be written as a control problem:
u(t, x) = Max(αs)s>t ,Xt=x E
[ T∫
t
(
g
(
m(s,Xs)
)− h(∣∣α(s,Xs)∣∣))e−ρ(s−t) ds
]
,
with dXt = α(t,Xt ) dt + σ dWt .
As for any mean field game we use [5,6] to write the associated system of partial differential equations:
Proposition 1 (Mean field games PDEs). The control problem is equivalent to the following system of PDEs:
(Hamilton–Jacobi) ∂tu + σ
2
2
u + H(∇u) − ρu = −g(m),
(Kolmogorov) ∂tm + ∇ ·
(
mH ′(∇u))= σ 2
2
m,
where H(p) = Maxa(ap − h(a)).
Additional conditions are: m(0, ·) given, u(T , ·) = 0 and ∀t,m(t, ·) is a probability distribution function.
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that T is replaced by +∞:
(Hamilton–Jacobi)
σ 2
2
u + H(∇u) − ρu = −g(m),
(Kolmogorov) ∇ · (mH ′(∇u))= σ 2
2
m,
with m a probability distribution function.
3. The quadratic costs framework
3.1. Presentation
One of the simplest framework to deal with mean field games is to consider the special case of quadratic costs:
h(a) = 12a2. This case is indeed simpler since it allows to replace the system of coupled PDEs by a single PDE, either
on u or on m (the good variable is actually ψ = √m as we will see later on). Consequently, we focus extensively
on quadratic costs even though more complex models can be used to deal with problems involving congestion for
instance.
The quadratic costs framework is characterized by a simple Hamiltonian (H(p) = 12p2) and therefore the system
to solve is simplified:
Proposition 2 (Mean field games PDEs with quadratic costs). With quadratic costs, the system can be written as
(Hamilton–Jacobi) ∂tu + σ
2
2
u + 1
2
|∇u|2 − ρu = −g(m),
(Kolmogorov) ∂tm + ∇ · (m∇u) = σ
2
2
m.
In its stationary form, the system is simply:
(Hamilton–Jacobi)
σ 2
2
u + 1
2
|∇u|2 − ρu = −g(m),
(Kolmogorov) ∇ · (m∇u) = σ
2
2
m.
3.2. From two coupled PDEs to one
We are going to enounce two propositions that show the interest of the quadratic costs.
Proposition 3 (One PDE in u). Let us consider a couple (K,u) where K is a scalar. If (K,u) is a solution of Eqs. (1)
and (1′) then (u,K exp( 2u
σ 2
)) is a solution of our initial stationary problem:
σ 2
2
u(x) + 1
2
∣∣∇u(x)∣∣2 − ρu(x) = −g(K exp(2u(x)
σ 2
))
, (1)
∫
K exp
(
2u(x)
σ 2
)
= 1. (1′)
Another way to look at the problem is to consider an equation in m or more exactly an equation in ψ where ψ is
defined as the square root of m.
Proposition 4 (One PDE in ψ = √m). Let us consider a couple (K,ψ) where K is a scalar. If (K,ψ) is a solution
of Eqs. (2) and (2′) then, m = ψ2 and u = σ 2 ln( ψ ) are solutions of our initial stationary problem:K
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2
ψ(x)
ψ(x)
= ρσ 2 ln
(
ψ(x)
K
)
− g(ψ2(x)), (2)
∫
x
ψ(x)2 dx = 1. (2′)
The partial differential equation in ψ invites us to consider the case where (t, x) → g(m(t, x)) is the logarithm
function ln(m(t, x)) as an example of our population problem that may be solved easily and explicitly. This is our
next application.
4. Application to the logarithmic utility function
4.1. The basic framework
4.1.1. Presentation
We are going to build a very precise and explicit example that goes into the quadratic costs framework. We consider
one population and we suppose that all people in the population have the same preference function which is simply
g(m(t, x)) = ln(m(t, x)).
These preferences mean that inside the population, people want to resemble one another. However, they are
prevented to do so by the noise and our problem is to find the optimal behavior of individuals in such a context.
To sum up, we want to find stationary solutions to the problem:
u(t, x) = Max(αs)s>t ,Xt=x E
[ ∞∫
t
(
ln
(
m(s,Xs)
)− |α(s,Xs)|2
2
)
e−ρ(s−t) ds
]
,
with dXt = α(t,Xt ) dt + σ dWt .
In other words, we want to find a solution of the following system of PDEs:
(Hamilton–Jacobi)
σ 2
2
u + 1
2
|∇u|2 − ρu = − ln(m),
(Kolmogorov) ∇ · (m∇u) = σ
2
2
m.
4.1.2. Resolution
Proposition 5 (Gaussian solutions). Suppose that ρ < 2
σ 2
.
There exist three constants, s2 > 0, η > 0 and ω such that ∀μ ∈ Rn, if m is the probability distribution function
associated to a Gaussian variable N (μ, s2In) and u(x) = −η|x − μ|2 + ω, then (u,m) is a solution of our problem.
These three constants are given by:
• s2 = σ 44−2ρσ 2 ,
• η = 1
σ 2
− ρ2 = σ
2
4s2 ,
• ω = − 1
ρ
[ηnσ 2 − n2 ln( 2ηπσ 2 )].
Interestingly, we can come back to the control parameter α. This control parameter describes the move each agent
wants to make given her characteristics. We have the following result:
Proposition 6 (Optimal control). In the framework of the preceding proposition, the optimal control parameter α is
given by α(x) = −2η(x − μ). This means that for any agent, her characteristics Xt follows an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process that mean-reverts around μ:
dXt = −2η(Xt − μ)dt + σ dWt .
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The preceding example is interesting in the fact that we have been able to exhibit explicit solutions (this can be
generalized to a more complex Brownian motion). One caveat, though, is that these solutions are specific to the
logarithmic case.
Another problem with our setting is that we only describe possible stationary solutions and the path from an initial
distribution to a stationary solution is not dealt with.
This comment leads to the third issue in this example which is the infinite number of solutions. This problem can
be dealt with in a very simple way. It is indeed possible to say that, in addition to their willingness to be like each
others, agents in the population love a certain characteristics μ∗. In that case, the stochastic control problem can be
replaced by:
Max(αs)s>t ,Xt=x E
[ ∞∫
t
(
ln
(
m(s,Xs)
)− δ|Xs − μ∗|2 − |α(s,Xs)|22
)
e−ρ(s−t) ds
]
,
with
dXt = α(t,Xt ) dt + σ dWt .
With this quadratic form, one can generalize the preceding computations and we get the following localization
result.
Proposition 7 (Localization). In this new problem any Gaussian solution has to be centered in μ∗. The variance
coefficient is s2 = σ 24η where η is now the unique positive solution of
2η2 − η
(
2
σ 2
− ρ
)
= δ.
5. Stability in the logarithmic case
Let us consider the logarithmic case of the last section and let us work for simplicity in dimension 1.4 We have
found stationary solutions of the problem and up to a translation we can consider that μ = 0 so that the stationary
solution we consider is:
u∗(x) = −ηx2 + ω,
m∗(x) = 1√
2πs2
exp
(
− x
2
2s2
)
.
An interesting question is the stability of this stationary solution.
We are going to consider two notions of stability. The first notion of stability is the classical physical notion of local
stability. If an equilibrium is given, it will be said locally stable in the classical sense if, after a small perturbation,
the system goes back (perhaps asymptotically) to the initial equilibrium. A second notion of stability is inspired from
the eductive viewpoint in economic theory (see [4]). Typically, the equilibrium will be said to be locally stable in the
eductive sense if, the common knowledge that the equilibrium is in a given neighborhood allows agents to find, by a
mental process5 (i.e. without any time-dependent learning) the actual equilibrium.
5.1. Local physical stability
To work on the local stability in the classical sense, we consider the PDEs of Proposition 2 and we introduce
perturbations on the solutions (for μ = 0). These perturbations can be written as,
4 The results we will obtain can be generalized really easily in higher dimension using Hermite polynomials in higher dimension.
5 In the seminal articles on eductive stability, the mental process was linked to the notion of rationalizable solutions, see [4] for more details.
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u(T , x) = u∗(x) + εφ(T , x),
φ(T , ·) = φ(·) and ψ(0, ·) = ψ(·) are given and represent respectively the relative perturbation on m∗ and the absolute
perturbation on u∗.6
We are going to study the dynamics of the functions φ and ψ where we consider the linearized PDEs.
Proposition 8 (Linearized PDEs). The linearized PDEs around (u∗,m∗) are:
(Hamilton–Jacobi) φ˙ + σ
2
2
φ′′ − 2ηxφ′ − ρφ = −ψ,
(Kolmogorov) ψ˙ − σ
2
2
ψ ′′ + 2ηxψ ′ = −φ′′ + x
s2
φ′.
A more convenient way to see these linearized PDEs is to introduce the L operator f → Lf = −σ 22 f ′′ + 2ηxf ′
and to recall that s2 = σ 24η .
Proposition 9 (Linearized PDEs). The above equations can be written as
(Hamilton–Jacobi) φ˙ = Lφ + ρφ − ψ,
(Kolmogorov) ψ˙ = −Lψ + 2
σ 2
Lφ.
Now, we are going to use the properties of the operator L we have just introduced. To do that we need to use some
properties of the Hermite polynomials (see [1]) associated to the space L2(m∗(x) dx).
Definition 1 (Hermite polynomials). We defined the nth Hermite polynomial of L2(m∗(x) dx) by:
Hn(x) = sn 1√
n! (−1)
n exp
(
x2
2s2
)
dn
dxn
exp
(
− x
2
2s2
)
.
Proposition 10 (Hermite polynomials as a basis). The polynomials (Hn)n form an orthonormal basis of the Hilbert
space L2(m∗(x) dx).
Proposition 11 (Hermite polynomials as eigenvectors of L). The Hermite polynomials Hn are eigenvectors of L, and
LHn = 2ηnHn.
Now that we have recalled some basics about the Hermite polynomials we can use them to solve the linearized
PDEs of Proposition 9. Let us start first with the matrices (An)n that are going to be involved to solve the problem:
An =
(
ρ + 2ηn −1
n
s2
−2ηn
)
.
Lemma 1 (Eigenvalues of An). Let us consider n 2.
The eigenvalues of An are of opposite signs, λ1n < 0 < λ2n with:
λ1,2n =
1
2
[
ρ ±
√
ρ2 + 16η2n(n − 1) ].
It is interesting to notice that for a system of two linear PDEs like this we are working on, one equation being
forward and the other being backward, the stability result will arise from the opposite signs of the eigenvalues.
6 It is in fact really important to consider the relative variation in the case of the probability distribution function m.
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Let us consider for n 2 the functions ( φn
ψn
) that verify:(
φ˙n
ψ˙n
)
= An
(
φn
ψn
)
,
with φn(T ) equal to φn and ψn(0) equal to ψn.
We have:
φn(t) = On
(
ψn
4ηn
eλ
1
nt
)
+ On
(
φne
−λ2n(T−t)),
ψn(t) = On
(
ψne
λ1nt
)+ On(φne−λ2n(T−t)).
In particular,
∀t ∈ (0, T ), ∀k ∈ N, (nkφn(t))n ∈ l1 (⊂ l2), (nkψn(t))n ∈ l1 (⊂ l2).
The estimates we established in the preceding proposition are the basis of the regularization property we will
obtain in the following proposition. What we will show is indeed that whatever the regularity of the perturbations in
the Hilbert space H = L2(m∗(x) dx), the solutions are going to be in C∞ on (0, T ) × R.
Proposition 13 (Resolution of the PDEs). Suppose that
• The perturbations ψ and φ are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m∗(x) dx).
• ∫ ψ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (mass preservation condition).
• ∫ xψ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (mean preservation condition).
• ∫ xφ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the perturbation is even).
Let us define (φn)n and (ψn)n by:
• φ0(t) = φe−ρ(T −t) and ψ0(t) = 0.
• φ1(t) = ψ1(t) = 0.
• ∀n 2, φn and ψn defined as in the preceding proposition.
Then φ(t, x) = ∑∞n=0 φn(t)Hn(x) and ψ(t, x) = ∑∞n=0 ψn(t)Hn(x) are well defined in H , are in C∞ and are
solutions of the PDEs with the boundary conditions associated to φ and ψ .
Now, what we want to demonstrate is a stability result. We want to show that, as T goes to infinity (the initial
and final perturbations remaining unchanged), the influence of the perturbation vanishes. This is the purpose of the
following proposition:
Proposition 14 (Stability I). Suppose that
• The perturbations ψ and φ are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m∗(x) dx).
• ∫ ψ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (mass preservation condition).
• ∫ xψ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (mean preservation condition).
• ∫ xφ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the perturbation is even).
Then, ∀n,∀α ∈ (0, 12 ):
lim
T→∞‖φn‖L∞([αT ,(1−α)T ]) = 0, limT→∞‖ψn‖L∞([αT ,(1−α)T ]) = 0.
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mass preservation is natural since the total mass must remain the same. Then, the two other conditions are necessary
because of the invariance by translation of the problem.
The result we have just obtained is a weak form of stability but stronger stability results can be obtained.
An example of such an improvement is:
Proposition 15 (Stability II). Suppose that
• The perturbations ψ and φ are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m∗(x) dx).
• ∫ ψ(x)m∗(x) dx (mass preservation condition).
• ∫ xψ(x)m∗(x) dx (mean preservation condition).
• ∫ xφ(x)m∗(x) dx (this is guaranteed if the perturbation is even).
Then
lim
T→∞ supt∈[αT ,(1−α)T ]
∥∥φ(t, ·)∥∥
L2(m∗(x) dx) = 0,
lim
T→∞ supt∈[αT ,(1−α)T ]
∥∥ψ(t, ·)∥∥
L2(m∗(x) dx) = 0.
Proof. It is a simple application of the Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem. 
5.2. Local eductive stability
Now, we are going to consider another notion of stability that has more to do with the justification of rational
expectation hypothesis or with the process through which agents will mentally understand what will be the stationary
equilibrium.
The goal in the next paragraphs is in fact to consider an initial guess for the stationary equilibrium (in the
neighborhood of the actual equilibrium) and to exhibit a “mental process” (this process is actually a continuous process
based on two PDEs involving what we call virtual time) that goes from the initial guess to the true equilibrium.
Let us consider the two equations of Proposition 2:
σ 2
2
u′′ + 1
2
u′2 − ρu + ln(m) = 0,
σ 2
2
m′′ − (mu′)′ = 0.
We are going to introduce a variable θ called virtual time and consider, given an initial guess (u(θ = 0, x),
m(θ = 0, x)) for the equilibrium, the mental process associated with the following system of PDEs:
∂θu = σ
2
2
u′′ + 1
2
u′2 − ρu + ln(m),
∂θm = σ
2
2
m′′ − (mu′)′.
Since we only want to consider a local eductive stability, we are going to work with the linearized version of these
equations that is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 16 (Linearized mental process). The linearized mental process around (u∗,m∗) is given by:
∂θφ = σ
2
2
φ′′ − 2ηxφ′ − ρφ + ψ,
∂θψ = σ
2
2
ψ ′′ + 2ηxψ ′ − φ′′ + x
s2
φ′,
where φ and ψ are defined as before and where φ(0, ·) and ψ(0, ·) are given.
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We can write these equations using the L operator introduced earlier:
Proposition 17. The above equations can be written as
∂θφ = −Lφ − ρφ + ψ,
∂θψ = −Lψ + 2
σ 2
Lφ.
To solve these equations, we need to introduce the matrices (Bn)n:
Bn =
(−(ρ + 2ηn) 1
n
s2
−2ηn
)
.
Lemma 2 (Eigenvalues of Bn). Let us consider n 2.
The eigenvalues ξ1n < ξ2n of Bn are both negative with:
ξ1,2n =
1
2
[
−ρ − 4ηn ±
√
ρ2 + 4n
s2
]
.
Proposition 18. Let us suppose that the initial conditions φ(0, ·) and ψ(0, ·) are in the Hilbert space
H = L2(m∗(x) dx).
Let us consider for n 2 the functions ( φn
ψn
) that verify:(
∂θφn
∂θψn
)
= Bn
(
φn
ψn
)
,
with φn(0) equal to φ(0, ·)n and ψn(0) equal to ψ(0, ·)n.
We have:
φn(θ) = On
(∣∣φn(0)∣∣eξ2n θ ),
ψn(θ) = On
(√
n
∣∣φn(0)∣∣eξ2n θ ).
In particular,
∀θ > 0, ∀k ∈ N, (nkφn(θ))n ∈ l1 (⊂ l2), (nkψn(θ))n ∈ l1 (⊂ l2).
As before these estimations show that the solutions will be far more regular than the initial conditions.
Proposition 19 (Resolution of the PDEs associated to the mental process). Suppose that:
• The initial conditions φ(0, ·) and ψ(0, ·) are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m∗(x) dx).
• ∫ ψ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess for m is a probability distribution function).
• ∫ xφ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even).
• ∫ xψ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even).
Let us define (φn)n and (ψn)n by:
• φ0(θ) = φ0(0)e−ρθ and ψ0(θ) = 0.
• φ1(θ) = ψ1(θ) = 0.
• ∀n 2, φn and ψn defined as in the preceding proposition.
Then φ(θ, x) =∑∞n=0 φn(θ)Hn(x) and ψ(θ, x) =∑∞n=0 ψn(θ)Hn(x) are well defined in H , are in C∞, are solutions
of the PDEs and verify the initial conditions.
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• The initial guesses φ(0, ·) and ψ(0, ·) are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m∗(x) dx).
• ∫ ψ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess for m is a probability distribution function).
• ∫ xφ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even).
• ∫ xψ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even).
Then the solution (φ,ψ) of the mental process converges in the sense that
lim
θ→∞
∥∥φ(θ, ·)∥∥
L2(m∗(x) dx) = 0, limθ→∞
∥∥ψ(θ, ·)∥∥
L2(m∗(x) dx) = 0.
This proposition proves that given an initial guess in the neighborhood of a stationary solution, if the initial guess
is symmetric around the stationary solution, then, the mental process associated to the PDEs allows agents to find the
solution. This is what we called local eductive stability.
5.3. Remarks on the conditions to have stability results
In both the proof of the physical stability and the proof of the eductive stability, there was a need to impose
symmetry conditions on the perturbations or on the initial guesses. These conditions were necessary to ensure stability
because both A1 and B1 were singular. If one wants to have stability results for more general initial perturbations or
initial guesses, the intuitive idea is to break the translation invariance of the problem.
Interestingly, we have done that before in the paragraphs dedicated to localization. This localization idea can be
used once again, to have more general stability results. If we center the problem around 0 as before, we know that the
only relevant difference between the original problem and the problem with an additional term −δx2, that localizes
the problem around 0, is the positive constant η that depends on δ according to the equation:
2η2 − η
(
2
σ 2
− ρ
)
= δ.
Now, in this context we can prove that the eigenvalues of An are of opposite signs for n 1 and that the eigenvalues
of Bn are both negative for n 1 (remember that we needed n to be larger than 2 to have these properties in the case
where δ = 0).
Lemma 3 (Eigenvalues of An and Bn for δ > 0). Suppose that δ > 0 and n 1.
Then, the eigenvalues λ1,2n of An =
( ρ+2ηn −1
n
s2
−2ηn
)
are of opposite signs. Similarly, the eigenvalues ξ1,2n of
Bn =
(−(ρ+2ηn) 1
n
s2
−2ηn
)
are both negative.
This lemma can be used to prove general stability results when δ > 0. It is indeed straightforward that all our
stability results can be rewritten exactly the same if one replaces the conditions:{∫
xψ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0∫
xφ(x)m∗(x) dx = 0 by δ > 0 (physical stability),
or {∫
xψ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0∫
xφ(0, x)m∗(x) dx = 0 by δ > 0 (eductive stability).
5.4. Concluding remarks on the two stability notions
Even though the two kinds of stability look like each other, the two notions of stability we used are completely
orthogonal. The physical stability is indeed linked to a perturbation of the system. The system is physically stable be-
cause, after an initial perturbation of m∗ and a final perturbation of u∗, under some conditions, the solution of the game
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reasoning. This is not the case of the eductive stability because the mental process is purely forward (in virtual time).
We start from a guess not too far from an equilibrium (the equilibrium being a priori unknown) and the mental process
converges toward this equilibrium.
The fact that our solutions are stable for both the physical stability and the eductive stability backs up the mean
field game approach to find relevant solutions.
Finally, the fact that eductive stability is a purely forward notion of stability is good news for numerical methods
to find solutions. Numerical recipes are the purpose Appendix A.
6. Conclusion
The model we presented in this paper is the archetype of a dynamical mean field game model in continuous time
with a continuous state space. Although the specification is simple, examples can be quite easily built with different
specifications and several populations that interact with one another. Also, we have dealt with the two relevant notions
of stability and the second one is of great help to find general numerical methods to solve forward–backward PDE
systems like those presented above.
Appendix A. Insights in the numerical methods
This appendix is dedicated to numerical methods to solve the mean field games presented in the above text in more
general cases where explicit solutions cannot be exhibited. The approach we present is inspired from the eductive
stability notion because eductive stability is based on a purely forward reasoning. The forward/backward structure of
mean field games is indeed quite problematic when it comes to find numerical solutions. The introduction of a virtual
time in the eductive stability helps a lot to circumvent this issue.
First, we are going to present methods to find stationary solutions and then, we will use the same ideas to find
dynamical solutions. We must keep in mind that the functions we are looking for are, in practice, approximated by
Fourier series with only a finite number of harmonics.
A.1. Stationary equilibrium
First, let us recall the two equations that characterize a stationary equilibrium:
(Hamilton–Jacobi)
σ 2
2
u + 1
2
|∇u|2 − ρu = −g(x,m),
(Kolmogorov) ∇ · (m∇u) = σ
2
2
m.
The Hamilton–Jacobi equation can be simplified using the change of variable β = exp( u
σ 2
), and we obtain:
(Hamilton–Jacobi)′ σ
2
2
β = β
[
ρ ln(β) − 1
σ 2
g(x,m)
]
,
(Kolmogorov)′ ∇ ·
[
σ 2
(
m
∇β
β
)]
= σ
2
2
m.
The two equations (Hamilton–Jacobi)′ and (Kolmogorov)′ can be written in a more practical way for numerical
resolutions by “inverting” the  operators. This can be done in the Kolmogorov equation by restricting the Laplace
operator to probability distribution functions (since in practice we restrict ourselves to Fourier series with only a finite
number of harmonics) and we obtain:
(Kolmogorov)′ − m +
[
σ 2
2

]−1(
σ 2∇ ·
(
m
∇β
β
))
= 0.
This cannot be done in the case of the Hamilton–Jacobi equation but we can invert an operator like σ 22 − Id for any
 > 0. This gives:
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[
σ 2
2
 − Id
]−1(
β
[
ρ ln(β) − 1
σ 2
g(x,m) − 
])
= 0.
Using these equations we can consider the ideas of eductive stability and try to obtain solutions by solving the follow-
ing equations where we introduce the virtual time θ :⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂θm = −m +
[
σ 2
2

]−1(
σ 2∇ ·
(
m
∇β
β
))
,
∂θβ = −β +
[
σ 2
2
 − Id
]−1(
β
[
ρ ln(β) − 1
σ 2
g(x,m) − 
])
.
Numerically these equations are quite easy to solve using Fourier methods. An example is shown below where
g(x,m) = √m − δx2 with σ 2 = 0.4, ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.5 on the domain [−1,1] (we took  = ρ3 ).
Fig. 1. Initial guess: N (0,0.3). Solution after 8000 iterations with dθ  0.01 (an iteration is drawn every 40 iterations). Only 15 harmonics are
used.
A.2. Dynamical problems
Similar ideas can be used to solve dynamical problems on a time interval [0, T ]. If we write the two equations that
characterize the dynamics of a mean field game we get, using the same change of variable as above:
(Hamilton–Jacobi)′ ∂tβ + σ
2
2
β = β
[
ρ ln(β) − 1
σ 2
g(x,m)
]
,
(Kolmogorov)′ ∂tm + ∇ ·
[
σ 2
(
m
∇β
β
)]
= σ
2
2
m.
Two constraints must be added that are m(0, ·) = m and β(T , ·) = β .
These two equations can be written using a forward and a backward heat operator:
F−β = ∂tβ + σ
2
β = β
[
ρ ln(β) − 12 g(x,m)
]
,2 σ
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2
2
m = −∇ ·
[
σ 2
(
m
∇β
β
)]
.
The F− operator is invertible if we restrict the operator to functions7 β’s where β(T , ·) = β . Similarly, the F+ operator
is invertible if we restrict it to functions m’s where m(0, ·) = m. Therefore, we can write the eductive equations as
follows: ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂θm = −m + F−1+
(
−σ 2∇ ·
(
m
∇β
β
))
,
∂θβ = −β + F−1−
(
β
[
ρ ln(β) − 1
σ 2
g(x,m)
])
.
Solutions to these equations can be found using Fourier methods.
Hereafter, we take the case of a population initially normally distributed around −0.3 (with a standard deviation
of 0.2) and agents have a utility function of the form g(x,m) = √m − δx2. Parameters value are σ 2 = 0.4, ρ = 0.4,
δ = 0.5 and the domain is [−1,1].
Fig. 2. Initial condition: N (−0.3,0.2). t goes from 0 to T = 40 with dt  0.1. u(T ) = 0. 800 iterations are considered before drawing
(with dθ  0.01). Only 15 harmonics are used.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. The only thing to prove is that m(x) = K exp( 2u(x)
σ 2
) is a solution of the Kolmogorov equa-
tion. Taking logs and deriving we have ∇m = 2∇u
σ 2
m. Hence, if we apply the divergence operator to each side we
obtain the Kolmogorov equation. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us consider (K,ψ) solution of the preceding equations and let us introduce m = ψ2 and
u = σ 2 ln( ψ
K
).
7 Functions are Fourier series with a finite number of harmonics.
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∇m
m
= 2∇ψ
ψ
,
∇u = σ 2 ∇ψ
ψ
= σ
2
2
∇m
m
.
Hence, (u,m) verifies the Kolmogorov equation.
Now,
u = σ 2
[
ψ
ψ
− |∇ψ |
2
ψ2
]
= σ 2 ψ
ψ
− 1
σ 2
|∇u|2
⇒ σ
2
2
u(x) + 1
2
∣∣∇u(x)∣∣2 = σ 4
2
ψ(x)
ψ(x)
= ρσ 2 ln
(
ψ(x)
K
)
− g(ψ2(x))
⇒ σ
2
2
u(x) + 1
2
∣∣∇u(x)∣∣2 − ρu(x) = −g(m(x)).
Hence, (u,m) verifies the Hamilton–Jacobi equation. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We are going to use Proposition 3 and the PDE in u.
We are looking for a solution for u of the form:
u(x) = −η|x − μ|2 + ω.
If we put this form in the Hamilton–Jacobi equation of Proposition 3 we get:
2η2|x − μ|2 + ρη|x − μ|2 − ρω − ηnσ 2 = − ln(K) + 2η|x − μ|
2
σ 2
− 2ω
σ 2
.
A first condition for this to be true is:
2η2 + ρη = 2η
σ 2
⇐⇒ η = 1
σ 2
− ρ
2
.
A second condition, to find ω, is related to the fact that m is a probability distribution function (Eq. (1′)). This clearly
requires η to be positive but this is guaranteed by the hypothesis ρσ 2 < 2. This also implies:
K exp
(
2ω
σ 2
)∫
Rn
exp
(−2η
σ 2
|x − μ|2
)
= K exp
(
2ω
σ 2
)(
πσ 2
2η
) n
2 = 1 ⇒ ρω + ηnσ 2 = n
2
ln
(
2η
πσ 2
)
,
and this last equation gives ω.
From this solution for u we can find a solution for m. We indeed know that m is a probability distribution function
and that m is given by:
m(x) = K exp
(
2u(x)
σ 2
)
.
As a consequence, m is the probability distribution function of an n-dimensional Gaussian random variable with
variance equal to s2In where s2 = σ 24η i.e. s2 = σ
4
4−2ρσ 2 . 
Proof of Proposition 8. A Taylor expansion of the ln is the only thing needed to obtain the HJB equation.
For the Kolmogorov equation, the linearized PDE first appears as:
ψ˙m∗ − σ
2
2
(ψm∗)′′ + (−2ηxψm∗)′ = −(φ′m∗)′.
Since (m∗)′ = − x2 m∗ and (m∗)′′ = ( x24 − 12 )m∗, we obtain:s s s
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2
2
(
ψ ′′ − 2 x
s2
ψ ′ +
(
x2
s4
− 1
s2
)
ψ
)
− 2ηψ − 2ηxψ ′ + 2ηx
2
s2
ψ = −φ′′ + x
s2
φ′.
Using now the fact that s2 = σ 24η , we obtain the result. 
Proof of Lemma 1. The eigenvalues are the roots of the polynomials X2 − ρX − 2ηn(ρ + 2ηn) + n
s2
. We can
compute :
 = ρ2 + 8ηn
(
ρ − 2
σ 2
+ 2ηn
)
.
Hence, using the relations between η and ρ we get:
 = ρ2 + 16η2n(n − 1).
Since n 2 we have  > ρ2 and therefore the two roots are real, one is positive and the other is negative. 
Proof of Proposition 12. If we use the preceding lemma, we see that we can write:(
φn(t)
ψn(t)
)
= C1n,T eλ
1
nt
(
1
v1n
)
+ C2n,T eλ
2
nt
(
1
v2n
)
,
where the v’s are found using eigenvectors of the matrix An:
v1n = ρ + 2ηn − λ1n, v2n = ρ + 2ηn − λ2n.
Now, to find the two constants we need to use the conditions on φn(T ) and ψn(0):{
φn(T ) = φn = C1n,T eλ
1
nT + C2n,T eλ
2
nT ,
ψn(0) = ψn = C1n,T v1n + C2n,T v2n.
Hence, ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
C1n,T =
v2nφn − eλ2nT ψn
v2ne
λ1nT − v1neλ2nT
,
C2n,T =
v1nφn − eλ1nT ψn
v1ne
λ2nT − v2neλ1nT
.
Using the fact that v1n ∼ 4ηn and v2n ∼ ρ2 + η we can deduce the asymptotic behavior8 of C1,2n,T as n goes to infinity(with T fixed).
C1n,T ∼n→∞
ψn
4ηn
, C2n,T ∼n→∞ φne−λ
2
nT .
Hence,
φn(t) = On
(
ψn
4ηn
eλ
1
nt
)
+ On
(
φne
−λ2n(T−t)),
ψn(t) = On
(
ψne
λ1nt
)+ On(φne−λ2n(T−t)).
These two estimations prove the results. 
Proof of Proposition 13. First of all, the preceding proposition ensure that the two functions φ and ψ are well defined,
in C∞, and that we can differentiate formally the expressions. Then, the first three conditions can be translated as
ψ0 = 0, ψ1 = 0 and φ1 = 0 and so the conditions at time 0 and time T are verified.
8 Here we assume that ψn = 0 and φn = 0. If one of these coefficients is equal to 0, the estimates of the proposition are still true and can even be
improved.
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under the sum sign because of the estimates of the preceding proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 14. The result is obvious for n = 0 and n = 1. For n 2, we need to go back to the expressions
of φn(t) and ψn(t).
First of all, let us go back to the two constants:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
C1n,T =
v2nφn − eλ2nT ψn
v2ne
λ1nT − v1neλ2nT
,
C2n,T =
v1nφn − eλ1nT ψn
v1ne
λ2nT − v2neλ1nT
.
Then,9
lim
T→∞C
1
n,T =
ψn
v1n
, C2n,T ∼T→∞ φne−λ
2
nT .
Using now the expressions for the functions,
φn(t) = C1n,T eλ
1
nt + C2n,T eλ
2
nt ,
ψn(t) = C1n,T v1neλ
1
nt + C2n,T v2neλ
2
nt ,
we get:
‖φn‖L∞([αT ,(1−α)T ]) 
∣∣C1n,T ∣∣eλ1nαT + ∣∣C2n,T ∣∣eλ2n(1−α)T ,
‖ψn‖L∞([αT ,(1−α)T ]) 
∣∣C1n,T v1n∣∣eλ1nαT + ∣∣C2n,T v2n∣∣eλ2n(1−α)T ,
and this leads to the result really easily. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The eigenvalues are the roots of the polynomials X2 + (ρ + 4ηn)X + 2ηn(ρ + 2ηn) − n
s2
. We
can compute :
 = ρ2 + 4n
s2
> 0.
Hence, the eigenvalues are real and are of the form given in the proposition. Since tr(Bn) < 0 and det(Bn) = 2ηn(ρ +
2ηn) − 4ηn
σ 2
= 4η2n(n − 1) > 0, the two eigenvalues are negative. 
Proof of Proposition 18. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 12.(
φn(θ)
ψn(θ)
)
= Aneξ1n θ
(
1
an
)
+ Bneξ2n θ
(
1
bn
)
,
where
an = ρ + 2ηn + ξ1n , bn = ρ + 2ηn + ξ2n .
Now, to find the two constants we need to use the conditions on φn(0) and ψn(0):{
φn(0) = An + Bn,
ψn(0) = anAn + bnBn.
Hence,
9 Here we assume that φn = 0. If this coefficient is equal to 0, the result is still true but the estimate for C2n,T cannot be written this way and is
in fact better than the estimate presented below.
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⎪⎪⎩
An = bnφn(0) − ψn(0)
bn − an ,
Bn = anφn(0) − ψn(0)
an − bn .
Using the fact that an ∼ −
√
η
σ
√
n and bn ∼
√
η
σ
√
n we can deduce the asymptotic behavior of the constants as n goes
to infinity:
An ∼n→∞ φn(0)2 , Bn ∼n→∞
φn(0)
2
.
Hence, since ξ1n < ξ2n ,
φn(θ) = On
(∣∣φn(0)∣∣eξ2n θ ),
ψn(θ) = On
(√
n
∣∣φn(0)∣∣eξ2n θ ).
These two estimations prove the results. 
Proof of Proposition 19. First of all, the preceding proposition ensure that the two functions φ and ψ are well defined,
in C∞, and that we can differentiate formally the expressions. Then, the first three conditions can be translated as
ψ0(0, ·) = 0, φ1(0, ·) = 0 and ψ1(0, ·) = 0 and so the conditions at time 0 is verified.
The fact that the PDEs are verified is due to the definition of φn and ψn and also to the fact that we can differentiate
under the sum sign because of the estimates of the preceding proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 20. We basically want to show that
+∞∑
n=0
∣∣φn(θ)∣∣2 →θ→+∞ 0, +∞∑
n=0
∣∣ψn(θ)∣∣2 →θ→+∞ 0.
This is actually a pure consequence of the estimates proved in Proposition 18 and of the Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem. 
Proof of Lemma 3. λ1,2n are the two roots of the polynomial X2 − ρX − 2ηn(ρ + 2ηn) + ns2 . The associated  is
given by:
 = ρ2 + 8ηn
(
ρ − 2
σ 2
+ 2ηn
)
,
 = ρ2 + 16η2n(n − 1) + 8nδ.
Hence, the eigenvalues λ1,2n = 12 (ρ ±
√
) are of opposite signs for n 1 since  > ρ2.
Now, ξ1,2n are the two roots of the polynomial X2 +(ρ+4ηn)X+2ηn(ρ+2ηn)− ns2 . The associated  is given by:
 = ρ2 + 4 n
s2
.
Hence, ξ1,2n = 12 [−ρ − 4ηn ±
√
ρ2 + 4n
s2
]. These two eigenvalues are negative if and only if,
ρ + 4ηn >
√
ρ2 + 4n
s2
⇐⇒ 8ρηn + 16η2n2 > 16ηn
σ 2
⇐⇒ 2ηn > 2
σ 2
− ρ,
and this is true for n 1. 
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